U.S. NRC Blog

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Emergency Preparedness on a Smaller Scale: Research Reactors

Michael Norris
Reactor Licensing Team Leader
Emergency Preparedness Division
 

When you think of the NRC’s role in emergency preparedness, nuclear power plants probably come first to mind. While we certainly pay a lot of attention to commercial reactors, we also oversee emergency plans for plants that make nuclear fuel, permanently shut down plants and sites that store spent power plant fuel.

Yet another area of emergency preparedness we oversee involves research and test reactors.

rtrThese “non-power” reactors don’t generate electricity, but they contribute to almost every field of science. These small facilities play important roles in research, testing and education on college campuses, and at government agencies across the country.

The NRC requires research and test reactors to maintain the same sort of emergency plans that large commercial reactors do. The NRC requires that these plans include, among other things, how to assess and classify abnormal events, how to respond to events, and how to establish planning zones for environmental monitoring and protective actions if needed.

The plans are very simple for research and test reactors since they are relatively small compared to a commercial nuclear power reactor. In fact, the largest NRC-regulated research reactor is about 75 times smaller than the smallest commercial reactor. Research and test reactor planning zones range in size from the building the reactor sits in to only about a half-mile radius around the facility – much smaller than the 10-mile emergency zone for power reactors.

Research and test reactors are required to train personnel and hold emergency preparedness exercises, and the NRC routinely inspects the plans to make sure they meet our requirements.

Should anything ever occur at these small non-power reactors, the NRC makes sure the facility staff know what to do and how to react to make sure people living or working or attending school in the area are safe, and that the environment is not impacted. It’s just another facet of what the NRC does on a large scale every day.

When “Nuclear” is the Star of Stage and Screen

Scott Burnell
Public Affairs Officer
 

Anything radioactive makes for good drama – or so many television and movie scriptwriters believe. “China Syndrome” in 1979 and “Silkwood” in 1983 are just two movieexamples of movies with nuclear themes – reactors in one and materials in another. But how accurate are Hollywood’s depictions of radioactive substances?

Often they’re off the mark by a lot.

But there are times when writers and producers check with us on whether a script or scene is close enough to reality for Hollywood’s purposes. This year we’ve gotten questions about the sequence of a reactor meltdown and its aftermath. We walked through the scenario in generalities, careful not to reveal security details or other protected information. We feel it’s in our best interest to have whatever accuracy is possible in a Hollywood production.

That being said, entertainment is not a documentary and often facts don’t get in the way of a good tale.

For instance, the 2005 season of the pressure-packed “24” had a “black box” that could remotely operate all U.S. nuclear power plants via the Internet. It made for thrilling TV, but this is what we said about that plot point: There is no such black box or suitcase for controlling nuclear power plants. Control systems at the plants are not accessible via the Internet.

“NCIS: Los Angeles” also aired an episode titled “Empty Quiver,” during which bad guys hijack a Department of Energy Secure Transport. One of our NRC experts saw the show and had first-hand knowledge of these vehicles. This is what he said about it: “The only similarity between what was shown on TV and reality is that in both cases the transport vehicles each had 18 wheels!”

In another example, the 2006 season of “West Wing” featured the government response to a nuclear power plant accident that in many – but not all ways – was fairly accurate. This is what the NRC said at the time: The NRC understands the writers’ literary license in assigning roles and responsibilities to various characters in the show, but the NRC would be the federal coordinating agency in any event involving a nuclear power plant.

So what’s the bottom line? When the plot synopsis reads “nuclear,” feel free to enjoy it, but don’t confuse fiction with fact.

Writing in Plain English—An Ongoing Challenge

Glenn Ellmers
Senior Communications Specialist
 

The NRC’s technical experts are highly educated individuals with a lot of expertise in their fields. But getting them to speak in plain English can be a challenge. That can be a problem because the public needs to be able to easily read and understand the reports these experts produce — explaining everything from whether a particular nuclear power plant is safe to what steps the NRC is requiring to make sure potential safety issues are addressed.

lettersThere is even a law—the Plain Writing Act of 2010—that requires government documents read by the public to be written in plain language, to the greatest degree possible. (This subject also happens to be a personal cause of NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane.)

The difficulty is that the nuclear facilities we regulate are, well … complicated! A power plant, for instance, may have many different types of pipes, valves, switches, gauges and electrical controls. Each of these parts must have a specific name that identifies where it fits in the whole. All of which leads to a plain language pitfall that grammar experts called “noun/adjective clusters.”

Here’s an example from a recent NRC document: “a through-wall leak was identified in the body of a Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Bypass Warmup Valve.” That’s a lot to swallow!

One solution is to drop any non-essential terms, and then use prepositions and other connecting words to break things up. So, “an isolation bypass warm-up valve for steam supply to Reactor Core Isolation Cooling,” would be a bit easier to follow. That’s still accurate but a bit less overwhelming. And, depending on the audience, it may be the better choice.

To comply with the Plain Writing Act—and to improve the clarity of our communications more generally—the NRC’s Executive Director of Operations has instructed the staff to include plain language summaries for technical documents that the public follows (mainly inspection reports, significant enforcement actions, and generic communications to NRC license-holders). A new memo reminding staff to use plain language will be issued later this month. And our human resources staff have created no less than five different training courses (some lasting two full days) to improve the staff’s plain writing skills.

Our Office of Public Affairs is also working to enhance the readability of many of our publications – including the Information Digest – by reducing the grade level needed to easily read the material.

We are not 100 percent there yet, but the NRC recognizes the importance of helping the public understand our documents, and we continue to take steps to improve in this area.

When Problems Are a Sign of Success

Chris Allen
Project Manager
Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation
 

Can a problem show that our regulatory system works? If you don’t think so, read on.

Two weeks ago, the NRC published an “information notice” about moisture causing problems for dry spent fuel storage casks. Information notices are one way the NRC communicates formally with licensees. We send these notices when we want all licensees to be aware of a particular problem found with just one or only a handful of licensed facilities or equipment so they can prevent similar problems.

Spent fuel dry casks

Spent fuel dry casks

The problem in this case centers on dry spent fuel storage casks that store used nuclear fuel after it’s been cooled for several years in spent fuel pools. The NRC reviews the designs of these casks to make sure they will safely cool the fuel and contain the radiation it emits.

In this case, two different sites using two different storage designs had unanticipated problems on the outside of the system caused by moisture. The structural integrity of the systems was never compromised and the radiation levels at both sites remained very low.

The first problem dates to 2007 at a facility in Idaho that stores spent fuel debris from the damaged Three Mile Island reactor. The system uses thick concrete for shielding and protection from earthquakes and other natural forces. The operator saw that cracks in the concrete—originally thought to be cosmetic and trivial—were spreading. The licensee’s evaluation found water had entered bolt holes on top of the casks, froze, thawed and cracked the concrete. The evaluation also identified repairs, ways to prevent more water from getting in and a program for monitoring cracking.

The second problem, at the Peach Bottom reactor site in Pennsylvania, was identified on October 11, 2010, when an alarm sounded. That alarm was designed to be an early warning that the helium inside might be leaking. On examination, the licensee found rust beneath a metal weather cover and moisture around the bolts holding the cask lid in place. An outer lid seal was leaking more helium than the NRC license allowed. An inner seal kept the spent fuel and radioactivity confined inside the cask.

From the time these issues were discovered, we made information available through licensee event reports, NRC inspection reports, letters and other communications with licensees. Our licensees and some trade publications that follow NRC activities closely knew of the issues.

The licensees talked with one another as well at industry-wide workshops and conferences. And our inspectors, who also talk with one another, always look for evidence that dry storage casks are in good condition.

So how does this mean the process worked?

Alarms like the one at Peach Bottom and follow-up evaluations like the one in Idaho are examples of the monitoring and periodic examinations that the NRC requires all cask users to perform. These provide warnings long before a problem could develop that might affect public health and safety or the environment. We also require periodic examinations of dry storage casks so any potential issues can be identified early.

The NRC stayed up-to-date as the licensees learned more about the cause of their problems, how to prevent such problems in the future, and how to fix the problems on their existing systems. In this case, the NRC took the extra step of issuing the information notice even though communication between the NRC and licensees as well as among licensees meant that, when the information notice came out last week, it was actually “old news.”

Tracking the Source: Pilgrim’s Tritium Link

Neil Sheehan
Public Affairs Officer, Region I
 

pilgIt may not be as daunting as searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack, but the process of trying to track down the source of tritium contamination at the Pilgrim nuclear power plant has been long and painstaking.

Since mid-2010, efforts have been under way to determine why certain groundwater monitoring wells at the Plymouth, Mass., site have detected very low levels of tritium, a naturally occurring radioactive form of hydrogen that is also a byproduct of nuclear power plant electricity production.

While tritium emits a weak form of radiation, does not travel very far in air and cannot penetrate the skin, the release of the radioactive material via an uncontrolled pathway is unacceptable to the NRC.

There is still more checking to be done, but now there is a possibility a 4-inch underground pipe might be the culprit.

The NRC, from the time the contamination was identified, has continued to press the plant’s owner, Entergy, to hunt for the point of origin so that further leakage could be prevented. Work done to find the source included extensive visual inspections of tanks, and piping and dye tests to track groundwater flows at the facility.

Until recently, those efforts did not bear fruit.

However, water leakage into the reactor building that occurred in mid-April helped plant personnel focus on the pipe in question. This pipe is used infrequently during any given year, to allow for the discharge of water containing small amounts of radioactivity, which limited the opportunities to detect this break. Still, this pipe was due to be checked as part of a voluntary nuclear industry initiative to inspect underground pipes and tanks that has been under way for several years and that all plants have undertaken.

The NRC will independently verify whether the pipe is, in fact, to blame for the contamination. In the meantime, the pipe has been removed from service to prevent any additional leakage. An NRC inspection of the plant’s implementation of the voluntary industry initiative is scheduled for September.

It’s important to note that the tritium contamination has remained on-site. Since the groundwater there is not used for drinking-water purposes, there is believed to be no risk to plant employees or the public as a result of the contamination.

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