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In Response to Your Letters: Proposed Restart of SONGS Unit 2

Over the past two weeks, the NRC has received a number of phone calls and emails from the local community and other concerned members of the public to voice their opinion regarding the proposed restart of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 2. Thank you for expressing your concerns. We value your input and understand how important these issues are. We are continually working to enhance our engagement with the public.

While we cannot respond to each person individually, the NRC would like to assure you that your concerns are being heard and that we are approaching the issue of restarting SONGS very carefully. We are committed to learning what happened at the plant before considering any restart options.

On October 4, the NRC received a letter from Southern California Edison indicating that they have addressed issues raised by the NRC in a Confirmatory Action Letter. At the same time, the NRC also received a proposed action plan that recommends restarting Unit 2 at the San Onofre plant for an initial five-month period at reduced power. This restart would be followed by additional inspection.

The NRC will analyze Southern California Edison’s determination of the causes of the steam generator tube degradation and actions to prevent future degradation before making any decision on the proposed restart plan of Unit 2. The NRC will take as much time as is required to complete its inspection and analysis preceding any decisions about restarting Unit 2. Restart of SONGS will not be permitted until the agency’s thorough review is completed and the facility is safe to operate. The Commission is also considering a petition for hearing and request for a stay of any authorization for restart until the conclusion of the hearing.

The NRC will continue to provide opportunities for the public to be involved and informed. For updates on the San Onofre plant go the NRC web site.

Allison Macfarlane
NRC Chairman

39 responses to “In Response to Your Letters: Proposed Restart of SONGS Unit 2

  1. Help Ever Hurt Never Baba October 28, 2012 at 11:27 am

    The results of Thermal-Hydraulic Computer models can vary as much as 200% depending the operational inputs and results of mock-up data. Some of these models simulate two-phase steam-water mixture sg side conditions using Homogeneous Equilibrium Models rather than hetrogeneous dispersion models. Computer simulations do not control the actual plant operating conditions. It is highly concievable that high localized vapor fractions, steam flows and velocities, Mitisubishi’s flowering effect, narrow tube pitch to tube diameter ratio caused insufficient contact forces between tubes and AVBs and fluid elastic instability in the SONGS Uniit 3 RSGs Tube-Bundle Centrallized region 20 inches above the 7th support plate in the Z direction. Use NRC’s Branch Chief advice reference earlier to find answer to all these questions. Insanity is repeating the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. NRC has been provided a unique opportunity and trust by Ratepayers and Taxpayers to ensure public safety and transparency and not violate this public trust by offering biased and favorable opinions for a INPO 4 Plant with the Worst Safety and Retaliation Record. NRC needs to be reminded that US Federal Government Promotes Human Rights, Democratic Institutions and Workers Respect throughout the World. NRC needs to become a Model Agency and follow Goverments’s Policies and Examples.

  2. Help Ever Hurt Never Baba October 28, 2012 at 10:45 am

    NRC needs to use the advice of a NRC Branch Chief with MIT Intelligence and sixth sense [read and reread in between the lines and use a critical questioning and investigative attitude} and then independentely check the SONGS 2 & 3 Operational records to understand why SONGS Unit 2 suffered less damage than unit 3 in-the in-plane direction (e.g., Unit 2 were Operating at Higher Secondary Pressure, Void Fraction was @ 96%, Reactor thermal power was less. May be because of these factors, there was no localized superheat, fluid elastic instability, higher than normal steam velocities in the Central Region of the U-Tube Bundle 20 inches above the 7th TSP. This was the region of high wear in unit 3]. Unit 2 degraded RSGs with hundreds of plugged tubes, narrow tube pitch to tube diameter ratio, low clearances between U-Bends (0.050 inches, design = 0.25 inches), Active Tubes with 28% TTW, only 8 % vidsual inspection of the RSGs, will rupture and leak like a sieve due to 100% void fraction caused by a Main steam Line break Accident. Operational assessments prepared by three independent experts lack clarity and a clear conclusion. Lots of assumptions used without valid engineering and operational basis due to Time Pressure and Lack of Critical questioning and Investigative attitude..

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