Sparking New Conversations on Reactor Fire Safety

Scott Burnell
Public Affairs Officer

ocoThis week, the NRC took enforcement action against Duke Energy Carolinas LLC for failing to meet an important deadline in improving its fire safety program at the Oconee nuclear plant in South Carolina. In a Confirmatory Order, the agency set a new timeline for Duke to make the necessary changes, including interim milestones that will each result in safety enhancements as Oconee completes the process.

Fire safety is an important and evergreen topic when discussing the safety of U.S. nuclear power plants. NRC regulations include two approaches to fire protection and the issue is easily misunderstood or misrepresented, so it benefits from a refresher on everything that fits under the “fire protection” umbrella.

Let’s start with the bottom line — every U.S. nuclear power plant meets the relevant NRC requirements for protecting its reactor from fire hazards. Even if a plant has an “exemption” from a part of the NRC’s least-flexible fire protection approach, called Appendix R, that plant can still shut down safely in case of a fire.

Appendix R is effectively a one-size-fits-all approach for plants that are in fact custom-built projects. Newer plants tend to be built closer to Appendix R requirements, while older plants are more likely to have difficulty meeting specific mandates.

When it was issued, the NRC knew that the appendix wouldn’t apply to every part of every plant, so plants would apply for exemptions where Appendix R didn’t make sense. The NRC has a well-established process for reviewing exemption requests, which must have solid technical support in order to be approved. When the federal court covering southern New York upheld the agency’s process, the ruling even noted the NRC rejects exemption requests if they’re not justified.

You can see an everyday example of exemptions when you take an eye exam to get a driver’s license. Since not everyone’s vision falls in the acceptable range, regulations allow people to wear glasses or contacts. This can be considered an “exemption” from uncorrected vision requirements that’s still acceptable and compliant with the law.

Even if a plant has Appendix R exemptions, the NRC inspects the plant’s overall fire protection program to ensure it maintains safety.

Exemptions are sometimes confused with separate “compensatory measures” plants will put in place for specific issues until permanent solutions are in place. Exemptions are permanent in any case, and as we noted, plants must justify their requests with solid data. Compensatory measures, while they can be acceptable for extended periods of time, are not a basis for exemptions. As with exemptions, however, the NRC only accepts compensatory measures if they will provide acceptable fire protection capabilities.

Compensatory measures also have an everyday example on the roads — when a traffic light is malfunctioning, a police officer normally directs traffic at the intersection. Instead of the city closing the intersection until the traffic lights are fixed, officials compensate for the degraded traffic light in an acceptable way.

Bottom line: The NRC will not accept any fix for an exemption or a compensatory measure unless it’s safe.

Oconee is switching to the second approach, an updated fire protection standard called NFPA 805. You can think of this standard as a way for plants to customize their fire protection based on risk information. For example, the risk of fire in an otherwise empty room with concrete walls with electrical cable trays is less than for the same room with a barrel of lubricating oil stored in a corner. Under this new standard, plants use advanced fire analysis tools to determine where their fire protection resources are most needed. Oconee was one of two plants testing the transition as pilot projects.

julydropquoteThe NRC is currently evaluating applications from several plants to switch to the NFPA 805 standard. When plants transition to NFPA 805, their analyses can uncover new fire protection issues, and the NRC ensures those issues are appropriately handled as they’re identified. All new issues are accounted for with compensatory measures, and will either be fixed by a change to the plant or evaluated as part of the transition to NFPA 805. Since switching to the new standard is optional, the NRC uses its “enforcement discretion” in deciding whether to take action against plants that find new issues during the switch. That decision is made after the issues are identified and compensatory measures are put in place.

There is no question that a fire at a nuclear plant can be serious business. The NRC takes it very seriously. In reading stories about the NRC’s fire safety program, it is important to remember that not all fires carry the same risk, and the risk depends on the size and location of a fire. Also, each plant has its own fire department and trained local firefighters to call on for additional help.

The NRC’s work on fire protection, as with all its efforts in overseeing U.S. nuclear power plants, is meeting its goal — ensuring the public remains safe.

Author: Moderator

Public Affairs Officer for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

8 thoughts on “Sparking New Conversations on Reactor Fire Safety”

  1. Besides NRC requirements for reactor safety, nuclear power plant workers are trained to protect themselves from hazards, such as fires, and then report them to the operations staff. A plant can evacuate non-essential people from a hazard area, but specially trained staff such as the fire brigade or first aid team will be sent to the area to deal with the hazard.

    Scott Burnell

  2. As a smaller picture than the safety of the Nuclear Plant as a whole, what fire safety precautions are used in the plant for staff?

  3. The info supplied is side stepping the power plant safety, the info is about spent fuel pools. What about the lose of power to the reactor, generators, back up generators that come on line, battery back up and damages to most equipment. From reports of the Carington event large transformers melted down and voltages so high it jumped switches, to save money I would expect that the switches do not have a fuse in series with them, with out fuses, breakers and switches will weld shut and lock up the on switches till replaced (would take many days like Fuku….) . Is there reports on the highest voltage and current influx the plant can handle safely. Info you gave seems low 10% high or low of normal operation not like Carington with two or many times more. Please give quantitative info on the maximum surges they can handle.?

  4. In much the same way as with fire protection, the NRC gets regular questions about how U.S. reactors can safely handle solar flares and electromagnetic pulses. We had a blog item on this subject in 2011:

    Late last year, the NRC partially accepted a petition asking to improve the rules that requiring U.S. reactors to remain safe after solar flares: The NRC will examine the basis for such a rule change if we determine ongoing post-Fukushima efforts fall short of satisfying the petition’s basic concern.

    Scott Burnell

  5. The NRC has created fire safety problems due to lax enforcement, enforcement discretion and exemptions which benefit the nuclear industry. NRC actions regarding nuclear plant fire safety does not protect public safety. You are increasing the risk of a catastrophic accident due to fire because of your lackluster history of fire regulation enforcement.

    At this point, the NRC is not protecting the public, you are protecting the nuclear industry’s bottom line. TVA’s Browns Ferry is an example of a plant which has had fires, and you still do not require fire safety standards to be met, 38 years later. The NRC utilizes enforcement discretion and exemptions to allow the nuclear industry to not comply with fire safety standards.

    There were lessons learned as a result of the Browns Ferry fire. Unfortunately, one of the lessons not learned was the necessity to enforce of fire regulations.

    Stringently enforce NFPA 805, stop discretionary enforcement of the fire code and stop your exemptions. The public must be protected, not the nuclear industry’s bottom line.

    Exemptions from the fire safety codes are not safe actions. There is a rather large difference between a nuclear reactor and a traffic light – your analogy reeks of propaganda instead of conveying truth to the public about the NRC’s problem regarding lack luster fire safety enforcement.

  6. Do a search —-poor safety at nuclear plant , many safety problems.
    Have they found a way to protect nuclear plants when the next Carington effect happens?

Comments are closed.

%d bloggers like this: