Chief, Quality Assurance and Vending Inspection Branch
The NRC doesn’t just oversee how nuclear power plants operate. We also oversee the quality of the important components that go into the reactors. That’s why NRC staffers are working with the French Nuclear Safety Authority and AREVA, a manufacturer of reactor components, to determine if a quality assurance investigation underway in France has implications for U.S. plants.
ASN – the acronym for the French regulator — requested the probe in early May after a flaw was discovered in the vessel of a reactor under construction at Flamanville in France. So AREVA checked the manufacturing records of the Le Creusot Forge, in central France. They found anomalies in the records of about 400 parts manufactured there since the plant opened in 1965. (Le Creusot Forge was purchased by AREVA in 2006.)
ASN says these are paperwork irregularities – inconsistencies, modifications or omissions in production files concerning manufacturing parameters or test results. The irregularities are troubling because complete documentation provides assurance the components were forged to the proper procedures and specifications.
They do not mean, however, that any parts or components manufactured at Le Creusot are defective.
AREVA announced at the end of May that it had completed two-thirds of its review and found no indications of safety issues. The company told the NRC about 10,000 documents are still under review. The company pledged to provide us with a list of U.S. plants affected by these paperwork irregularities when the investigation is completed around the end of July. We’ll continue to engage with ASN and AREVA to make sure we have a complete picture of how these irregularities may affect any components provided to U.S. nuclear power plants.
NRC’s regulations in 10 CFR Part 21, “Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,” require any entity that identifies reportable issues to evaluate them and inform the users of any impacted components. The users then have 60 days to do their own safety evaluations. If the users identify significant safety hazards, they must report these to the NRC by phone within two days, and in writing within 30 days.
AREVA and Le Creusot Forge are under contractual obligations to their U.S. customers (who are NRC licensees) to follow these reporting requirements. We’ll take appropriate regulatory and enforcement action if we find issues of safety significance. At this time, there is no indication of a safety issue with any components from Le Creusot covered by this quality assurance audit.
Regarding new reactors, Westinghouse Electrical Co., the architectural engineering firm for the AP1000 reactors under construction at Vogtle and V.C. Summer, has confirmed that no components at these plants were supplied by Le Creusot Forge.
Once AREVA completes its audit and we have a complete picture of the situation, the NRC has several options. We may issue a generic communication to keep the broader nuclear industry informed. We may also perform inspections to ensure conformance and compliance with our regulations.
More information will be coming on this issue. If the NRC determines that Le Creusot Forge has provided components to U.S. nuclear power plants, we’ll make sure those components are fully evaluated to determine any impact the documentation irregularities might have on their safety-related functions.
4 thoughts on “Quality Assurance Issues in France: Implications for U.S. Plants?”
I would suggest the mainly assigned function of Q/A inspection in-so-far-as your branch is concerned is complying with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B quality assurance of reactor components and other hardware and how your staff (limited resources) are doing, including all overseas travel etc in the current Agency environment. Also 10 CFR Part 21 non-compliance is outside of your defined assignment! Perhaps 101 Refresher on Q/A may be in order here, what do you think.
Is the NRC record keeping so poor they can’t tell if any components came from the Le Creusot Forge?This is nothing but industry protection. If the NRC has faith in their paperwork, they would immediately release a list of components.
Why are the French and the Belgium getting so nervous over reactor component paperwork?
I am the guy who recently ask the NRC to ultrasonically test all vessels. This was exactly the reason why I asked, can you really ever trust the aging paperwork?
How long have these components been installed in U.S. reactors? Le Creusot Forge and AREVA Inc are still in the process of determining the extent of condition. This evaluation will inform them of the components affected, the plants affected, and how long they have been installed. AREVA has informed NRC staff that they are looking at approximately 10,000 documents. The company informed the NRC that they will provide us with a list of components and plants affected when the evaluation is completed (expected to be by end of July).
If these components were defective or degraded what would the possible safety implications be? The safety implications will not be known until the vendor evaluations are completed. However, if significant safety hazards are identified as part of the evaluation, Le Creusot Forge and/or AREVA must report these to the NRC within two days. During our ongoing discussions with AREVA, they have informed the NRC that there is currently no indication of safety issues with the components at U.S. plants and that the issues they are evaluating deal mostly with the reconciliation of paperwork from the manufacturing/fabrication of the components.
Are all the components in question inspectable once they are installed? I understand from NRC technical staff and the nuclear industry that not all nuclear plant critical component are inspectable once installed. This is a current unresolved issue for aging management in reactor license renewals. The inspectability of components will depend on where they are installed in the plant. However, even if a component is not easily inspectable, tests and/or evaluations can usually be performed on similar/surrogate components to verify whether a component will perform as originally designed and licensed.
How long have these components been installed in U.S. reactors? If these components were defective or degraded what would the possible safety implications be? Are all the components in question inspectable once they are installed? I understand from NRC technical staff and the nuclear industry that not all nuclear plant critical component are inspectable once installed. This is a current unresolved issue for aging management in reactor license renewals.
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