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Tag Archives: nuclear power plants

Throwback Thursday – A July Trip to Tennessee

tbtzechOn July 16, 1987, this Chairman visited the NRC’s Technical Training Center in Chattanooga, Tenn. The TTC was transferred to the agency’s Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data as part of a reorganization that year. During his visit to the TTC, the then-Chairman was briefed on a reactor simulator that had been leased from the Westinghouse Electric. Co., for training in PWR technology.

Can you name the Chairman?

Pokémon Go — Not a Go at Nuclear Plants

Prema Chandrathil
Public Affairs Officer
NRC Region III

The highly popular cellphone game has found its way to a U.S. commercial nuclear power plant.

pokemanThe Pokémon Go game lets users chase and catch virtual creatures with their cellphone cameras. However, Pokémon Go and other games that use the GPS signals in our phones are creating safety and security issues. Local law enforcement officials across the country have cautioned folks to pay attention while playing and be careful not to wander into traffic (warnings that have not always been heeded). The phrase “heads up” takes on new meaning here.

The games have even enticed players to trespass on private property — including the Perry nuclear power plant in northeastern Ohio.

Recently, three teenagers pursued one of the strange looking cartoon creatures into the employee parking lot of the Perry plant, at 3 in the morning! Instead of catching the Pokémon, they were caught by security officers and escorted off the property.

But it could have ended very differently – and much more seriously — for these Pokémon pursuers.

Commercial nuclear plants are among the best-protected facilities in the country. Their security officers are highly trained professionals who carry guns and are authorized to use them in protecting the plant. Though you might not always see the protective measures and many details are not publically available, security is in place. (Click here for more info on the NRC’s security requirements for nuclear power plants.)

So have fun exploring and climbing over rocks searching for those virtual creatures, but the bottom line is be safe while playing these games. A nuclear power plant is not the place to be searching for Pikachu.

 

Part II: How the NRC Uses a Defense-in-Depth Approach Today to Protect the Public

Mary Drouin
Senior Program Manager
Division of Risk Assessment, Performance and Reliability Branch

Defense-in-depth is a central theme in the NRC’s regulatory oversight of the nuclear power industry. As our agency historian, Tom Wellock, discussed in Monday’s post, the concept of defense-in-depth emerged during the trench warfare of World War I. The idea of multiple lines of defense was applied to nuclear safety in the 1950s as the leading concept for protecting the public from the consequences of a nuclear reactor accident.

The NRC’s predecessor agency, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, spelled out defense-in-depth in a 1957 report called WASH-740, Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants. “Should some unfortunate sequence of failures lead to destruction of the reactor core … no hazard to the safety of the public would occur unless two additional lines of defense were also breached,” the report said.

These words are at the heart of defense-in-depth as it has been practiced for six decades: multiple layers of defense to protect against accidents and their effects to ensure the risk to the public is acceptably low.

In a recent report issued this spring, Historical Review and Observations of Defense-in-Depth (NUREG/KM-0009), the NRC looks at how the concept has evolved in practice over the years. It also includes views from other government agencies and the international community.

As the report explains, defense-in-depth recognizes that our knowledge is imperfect. Although we plan for all conceivable accidents, the unexpected may still occur. Even if we have anticipated an event, its characteristics and impacts may be unpredictable. Our design and operation of nuclear plants need to be robust enough to compensate for this lack of knowledge. Defense-in-depth offers multiple layers of protection in case one or more layers fail.

So we don’t just rely on preventing an accident; we also need strong defenses to mitigate the effects of any accident that does occur. This applies to nuclear power plants, waste management and security as well.

In practice, defense-in-depth addresses three principles that should be factored into the design and operation of systems and components to provide additional confidence that an accident would not compromise the defensive layers:

  • Redundancy means more than one component performs the same function – for example, having multiple pumps instead of a single one;
  • Independence means these multiple components rely on separate and distinct attributes to function – the multiple pumps have separate piping from the water tank to where they discharge, and are housed in separate compartments; and
  • Diversity means the multiple components performing the same function rely on different design features to operate – motor-driven pumps versus steam-powered pumps.

dindgraphicIn reactor safety, the layers of defense might be:

  • Maintain reactor stability by limiting the ability of events to disrupt operation (with protective measures such as fire-safe or flood-tight doors, seismically designed buildings)
  • Protect the reactor should operation be disrupted (emergency reactor core cooling with redundant pumps)
  • Barrier integrity to guard against a release of radioactivity to the environment (leak-tight containment structures, filtered vents, containment sprays) and
  • Protect the public if a release does occur (emergency preparedness plans)

This versatile framework can apply whether the risk to the public comes from the reactor, spent fuel pool, nuclear waste or security threats.

UPDATE: Keeping U.S. Reactors Safe from Power Pulses

Scott Burnell
Public Affairs Officer

The NRC requires U.S. nuclear power plants to be able to shut down safely in the face of many extreme events – tornados, hurricanes and earthquakes. But the NRC also takes into account far more unusual events, like solar flares and man-made electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Both can affect generators, transformers and other parts of the electric grid – which in turn could affect nuclear power plants.

The NRC has been examining these issues for more than 30 years, starting in the late 1970s when the agency studied how EMP could affect nuclear power plant safe-shutdown systems. In February 1983 the NRC issued the study’s conclusion: nuclear power plants’ safety systems can do their jobs after an EMP event. The agency revisited the issue in 2007 to account for the increasing use of digital computer systems in nuclear plants, which potentially could be more susceptible to EMP. The agency continued to conclude as recently as two years ago that nuclear power plants can safely shut down following an EMP event.

solarflareThe NRC has also examined “solar storms” and their potential to damage the electric grid. A strong geomagnetic storm on March 13, 1989, for example, severely disrupted electrical power equipment in Canada, Scandinavia, and the United States. After studying the event the NRC issued an Information Notice in June 1990, to ensure nuclear power plants understood how severe solar activity could affect transmission systems and other components of the power grid.

Additional research in 2010 analyzed and compared solar or geomagnetically-induced current events to those of the EMP events previously analyzed. This work led to the same conclusion as the EMP studies – U.S. nuclear power plants can safely shut down if a solar storm disrupts the grid.

The edge of the NRC’s authority lies in a nuclear power plant’s electric switchyard, where our rules mesh with those of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which oversees the nation’s electric grids. Another body, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation develops and enforces grid reliability standards. The NRC works closely with FERC and NERC on grid reliability issues, including the effects of solar or geomagnetic storms and EMP. In 2015 FERC began the process of creating reliability standards to protect the grid against these events.

In 2011 a citizen petitioned the NRC to revisit the issue of grid disruption. The petition discussed ensuring U.S. nuclear power plants have emergency systems to keep spent fuel pools cool for two years after an electric grid failure. The NRC’s draft rule on maintaining key plant safety functions after a severe event, issued last year, includes measures to keep spent fuel pools cool.

The NRC is also participating in a White House-led task force on better understanding and dealing with space weather such as solar flares. Much of this work aims to improve society’s ability to forecast and warn against these events. Both the Department of Energy and electric grid companies have started efforts to stockpile specialized electrical equipment (such as large transformers) needed to restore the grid after these events.

The original blog post ran in October 2011.

Quality Assurance Issues in France: Implications for U.S. Plants?

Kerri Kavanagh
Chief, Quality Assurance and Vending Inspection Branch

The NRC doesn’t just oversee how nuclear power plants operate. We also oversee the quality of the important components that go into the reactors. That’s why NRC staffers are working with the French Nuclear Safety Authority and AREVA, a manufacturer of reactor components, to determine if a quality assurance investigation underway in France has implications for U.S. plants.

ASN – the acronym for the French regulator — requested the probe in early May after a flaw was discovered in the vessel of a reactor under construction at Flamanville in France. So AREVA checked the manufacturing records of the Le Creusot Forge, in central France. They found anomalies in the records of about 400 parts manufactured there since the plant opened in 1965. (Le Creusot Forge was purchased by AREVA in 2006.)

investigationsASN says these are paperwork irregularities – inconsistencies, modifications or omissions in production files concerning manufacturing parameters or test results. The irregularities are troubling because complete documentation provides assurance the components were forged to the proper procedures and specifications.

They do not mean, however, that any parts or components manufactured at Le Creusot are defective.

AREVA announced at the end of May that it had completed two-thirds of its review and found no indications of safety issues. The company told the NRC about 10,000 documents are still under review. The company pledged to provide us with a list of U.S. plants affected by these paperwork irregularities when the investigation is completed around the end of July. We’ll continue to engage with ASN and AREVA to make sure we have a complete picture of how these irregularities may affect any components provided to U.S. nuclear power plants.

NRC’s regulations in 10 CFR Part 21, “Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,” require any entity that identifies reportable issues to evaluate them and inform the users of any impacted components. The users then have 60 days to do their own safety evaluations. If the users identify significant safety hazards, they must report these to the NRC by phone within two days, and in writing within 30 days.

AREVA and Le Creusot Forge are under contractual obligations to their U.S. customers (who are NRC licensees) to follow these reporting requirements. We’ll take appropriate regulatory and enforcement action if we find issues of safety significance. At this time, there is no indication of a safety issue with any components from Le Creusot covered by this quality assurance audit.

Regarding new reactors, Westinghouse Electrical Co., the architectural engineering firm for the AP1000 reactors under construction at Vogtle and V.C. Summer, has confirmed that no components at these plants were supplied by Le Creusot Forge.

Once AREVA completes its audit and we have a complete picture of the situation, the NRC has several options. We may issue a generic communication to keep the broader nuclear industry informed. We may also perform inspections to ensure conformance and compliance with our regulations.

More information will be coming on this issue. If the NRC determines that Le Creusot Forge has provided components to U.S. nuclear power plants, we’ll make sure those components are fully evaluated to determine any impact the documentation irregularities might have on their safety-related functions.

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