The NRC requires that all nuclear power plants follow strict access authorization regulations that are intended to make sure only trusted individuals have the OK to be in the most sensitive areas of the plant. These access authorization regulations require fingerprint checks, drug and alcohol screening, psychological testing and other hurdles when employees are first hired, and must be periodically updated if the individuals are to continue to have access to these areas.
But even once a worker has been granted so-called unescorted access, they are still subject to a “behavioral observation program.” In other words, the NRC requires that every plant have a program in which all employees and supervisors are trained in detecting problems such as drug or alcohol abuse or other impairments of employees.
As part of the program, all employees are required to report to their supervisors any suspicious behavior they see among their coworkers. Suspicious behavior could be a worker observed in an area of the plant where they don’t have authorization to be, or if a worker made threatening statements about harming people or plant equipment.
The NRC regulations even require workers to report on themselves or “self-disclose” if they, for whatever reason, believe they are no longer mentally and physically fit to safely perform their duties. An example of this is an employee undergoing marital problems that are causing them stress that interferes with their duties. Such an employee may be referred to an Employee Assistance Program or their assigned duties may be changed until the person is deemed fit for duty.
If a determination is made to deny the person unescorted access for any reason, their name and that fact is entered into an information sharing database that NRC requires all U.S. nuclear power plants to use. Should that person attempt to enter (or get a job at) another nuclear plant, the information about their access status would be available for review by the plant they were attempting to access.
Ultimately, a determination that an employee is not trustworthy or reliable – based on behavior observation or self reporting — has serious implications for that person maintaining their access authorization but such determinations are necessary to keep nuclear power plants operating safely in their communities.
REFRESH is an occasional series where we revisit previous blog posts. This one originally ran in May 2012.